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1. Self-models and persons 
„Man kann den eigenen Sinnen mißtrauen, aber 
nicht dem eigenen Glauben“, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, 
p. 514) once remarked. „Gäbe es ein Verbum mit der 
Bedeutung ,fälschlich glauben’, so hätte das keine 
sinnvolle erste Person im Indikativ des Präsens.“ But what 
if such a first-person entity is indeed a fiction in certain 
respects – or if it has at least false beliefs without being 
able to distrust them?  
Human beings are masters of deception if they 
want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they 
have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000, 
Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous, 
because those are the most successful liars who believe 
their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he 
who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly 
speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more 
radical self-deception which is quite useful – a systematic 
and continuous illusion regarding ourselves. Higher-order 
forms of self-consciousness, namely I-consciousness, are 
based on a feature which is called a self-model. This is an 
episodically active representational entity (e.g. a complex 
activation pattern in a human brain), the contents of which 
are properties of the system itself. It is embedded and 
constantly updated in a global model of the world, based 
on perceptions, memories, innate information etc. 
(Metzinger 1993). But because self-models cannot 
represent their own representations as their own 
representations as their own representations and so on ad 
infinitum, they are semantically transparent, i.e. on the 
level of their content they do not contain the information 
that they are models. Thus, such systems are not able to 
recognize their self-model as a self-model (Van Gulick 
1988). The result is an ego-illusion, which is stable, 
coherent, and cannot be transcended on the level of 
conscious experience itself. 
Such a self-model is not an epistemic luxury. It 
plays a role for the system, it is a weapon developed in the 
course of biological evolution. As Marcel Kinsbourne 
(1988, p. 249) said: „If the concept of self evolved, it did so 
on account of adaptive advantage, not because it reflects 
some objective truth. The concept of self reifies the 
organizing activity of a cybernetic device that incorporates 
its history (,experience’) into the basis for its actions. It is 
the construct around which are organized impressions and 
intentions that reach awareness.“  
Neuroscience suggests that mind coincides with 
certain brain processes (Vaas 1999) and has evolved as a 
goal-oriented device that implements predictive 
interactions between the organism and its environment. 
The capacity to predict the outcome of future events – 
necessary to orchestrate and express their movements 
successful active movements – seems to be the ultimate 
and most common of all global brain functions; 
consciousness and thinking can be viewed as an 
evolutionary internalization of movement, and a self-model 
is the centralization of prediction (Llinás 2001, Vaas 
2001a).  
   Such an approach for self-models – if it is 
basically correct, and it cannot be argued here that it 
actually is – has essential implications for our 
understanding of what is it to be a person. Rationality, 
higher-order intentionality, I-consciousness, intentional 
stance, autonomous agency, transcendence of the 
presence (i.e. a concept of time), language, altruism and 
morality are the main criteria for characterizing persons, 
but they are not totally independent, and it is controversial 
whether they are all necessary or sufficient. Central at 
least is I-consciousness and some sort of autonomy – 
terms which are also ambiguous. However, they do not 
necessarily subscribe to ego theories of persons which 
hold that there are irreducible ontological, immaterial 
substances endowed with certain properties like free will; 
but they are compatible with bundle theories assuming that 
persons are based on simpler, e.g. psychological, 
computational or physiological processes (cf. Vaas 1996, 
2001b).  
 
2. Free will as a useful illusion 
The mind body problem can be taken as a 
trilemma where any of the following three premises is 
excluded by the two others: (1) dualism – the mental is not 
the physical, (2) mental causation – the mental does 
causally influence the physical (and is affected by it), (3) 
physical closure – there is no nonphysical influence on the 
physical. The so-called mystery of consciousness consists 
in the explanatory gap between (1) and (2), i.e. how could 
matter (if at all) create mind? The problem of free will is the 
incompatibility of (2) and (3) if (2) requires (1). Here, the 
main opponents are: first, libertarianism – (3) is wrong, 
there are contracausal or nonphysical originations; second, 
incompatibilism (determinism) – (1) is wrong; and, third, 
compatibilism – (1) is wrong, but contradictions between 
(2) and (3) can be explained away.  
Strong arguments (which cannot be defended 
here) show that the philosophical problem of free will 
cannot be solved, for this would require the reconciliation 
of apparently inconsistent premises; but it might be 
dissolved by eliminating one of the premises, namely the 
claim that there are irreducible entities like free-floating 
selves or Cartesian egos with the ability to act due to their 
own non-physical power, for this cannot avoid the dilemma 
of either plunging into an infinite regress or leading to a 
mysterious causa sui. Ultimately our reasons, beliefs and 
volitions are non-consciously determined – by earlier 
experiences, heredity, physiology or external influences – 
and therefore not ultimately up to us (Honderich 1988, 
Kane 2002, O’Connor 1995, Vaas 2001c, Strawson 1986, 
Walter 1998, Wegner 2002).  
Nevertheless our misleading conception of being 
such selves with impressions of having free will has to be 
explained! We do conceive ourselves, at least sometimes, 
as being free, i.e. that we can decide between alternatives. 
This feeling depends on complex abilities of voluntary 
movement (Vaas 2001d), second-order emotions (without 
which we cannot act and choose in complex situations 
despite of rationality), a non-deprived development, non-
predictability or epistemic indeterminism (we cannot know 
the future for certain, especially not our own future; 
Wittgenstein 1921, 5.1362), rationality (the ability to reflect 
and reason), planning (and hence higher-order thoughts, a 
concept of the future), higher-order volitions, and sanity. 




These features are compatible with naturalism and 
determinism. Therefore it is not to deny a weaker form of 
free will. But this does not imply the existence of the kind 
of freedom for which Libertarianism is arguing. 
Libertarians still insist that our subjective 
impression of freedom is a powerful argument for free will. 
Thus, a sceptic should be able to explain such an 
impression within the framework of naturalism. And this is 
what an evolutionary perspective might achieve. 
Many zoo and field experiments as well as 
behavioral studies in the wild have shown that apes can 
respond differently according to the desires and beliefs of 
other individuals – rather than according only to the other’s 
overt behavior. Hence, they probably have what Daniel 
Dennett (1973) called the intentional stance: They ascribe 
intentions to others and take them into consideration for 
their own actions (Taylor Parker et al. 1994, Whiten and 
Byrne 1997) – at least we do this. Evolution shaped our 
minds respectively our brains to cope with our complex 
social lives. The social environment might have been a 
significant selective pressure for primate intelligence 
(Humphrey 1976) and the rapid expansion of our 
ancestors’ neocortex. This cortical enlargement – about a 
factor of four during the last five million years – is 
otherwise hard to explain; and there is evidence for a 
correlation between neocortical size and group-size or 
social complexity (Barton and Dunbar 1997). Since better 
access to food, a safer place to sleep or a higher rank in 
complex hierarchies normally increase the probability of 
producing more offspring than other group members, 
social intelligence pays off pretty well. The elaborated 
mental abilities of higher primates are conceived as the 
product of an evolutionary cognitive arms race leading to 
more and more sophisticated representational capabilities 
(representation of complex social relationships, higher-
order intentional stance, mind-reading, primitive theory of 
mind).  
We are forced by our very nature to interact with 
other people in a fundamentally different way than to 
interact with, say, stones and sticks (Strawson 1962). In 
cognitive psychology, there is plenty of evidence now that 
in attempting to make sense of other people, perceivers 
regularly construct and use categorical representations to 
simplify and streamline the person perception process 
(Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). This is advantageous 
only in so far as it influences one’s own actions.  
Thus, the evolution of an intentional stance is at 
the center of our impression of having free will: Ascribing 
intentional states to others necessarily includes ascribing 
volitions to them and assuming that they have the power to 
transfer their volitions into actions somehow, because this 
is the only way to get advantages from the intentional 
stance at all. For, if other beings are thought to have 
intentions but they would be causally inert, i.e. their 
behavior has nothing to do with their volitions, this 
ascription of intentions and hence volitions simply wouldn’t 
matter. However the intentional stance is not an irrelevant 
luxury. It is a powerful tool to get along with the complexity 
of the social world and even an anthropomorphically-
conceived nonsocial world (up to highly restricted activities 
– e.g. in playing computer chess nowadays it is common 
and useful to think and act as if the computer „wants“ and 
„plans“ something). Individuals endowed with this tool are 
better prepared for the struggle of social life. And it is 
advantageous to assume the volitions of others as 
somehow being independent of the environment or the 
past – not absolutely independent of course, but in an 
approximate sense, because this makes it a lot easier to 
deal with them due to the fact that complex organisms can 
act (or react) quite differently in similar circumstances and 
quite similar in very different circumstances. 
There is another reason to take a concept of 
volition as evolutionarily advantageous, and this is just the 
other side of the coin: To deal with other individuals in a 
complex way means also to plan one’s own actions 
carefully in an explicit way and evaluate their effects. This 
presupposes some kind of awareness of one’s own 
volition, hence a concept of will and self. Higher-order 
representations also take one’s own mental states into 
account – not only for decisions and follow-up analyses but 
also as a parameter in the plans of others regarding 
oneself. Thus, it is reasonable or even necessary to 
ascribe volitions to oneself, too – because otherwise one 
cannot reason about the mental states of others who are 
presumably dealing with oneself. This makes one’s own 
volitions explicit – and much more flexible. At least since 
the point from which there has been language with an 
inbuilt grammatical structure, distinguishing between 
subjects and objects, active and passive, present and 
future, such concepts of volition, actions and self-notions 
have been flourishing (Vaas 2000).  
This was not only the case in contexts of cheating, 
however! In the course of time co-operation became more 
and more important among our early ancestors. And the 
existence of some form of language already implies a high 
degree of co-operation – spoken language would never 
have emerged unless most people, most of the time, 
followed conventional usage. But co-operation in complex, 
not inherited forms also presupposes an intentional stance 
and the capacity to ascribe volitions to others.  
From this it is no big step to a notion of free will 
which is a powerful tool to act in consonance with or 
opposition to others and to establish some kind of moral 
responsibility – a very effective way to influence the 
behavior of others and justify punishments. Thus, free will 
even succeeded to become an entity of religious, 
philosophical or political theories and a postulate for 
jurisdiction. Of course we need not dismiss an intentional 
and personal stance. It is, obviously, crucial for our 
survival. We cannot leave our subjective standpoints, 
turning exclusively to an objective, perspectiveless view 
(cf. Nagel, 1986). We may accept that we have, ultimately, 
no free choice. Nevertheless, in our everyday life we think 
and act as if we did. Even sceptical philosophers do – or 
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